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And Nothing but the Truth: A Review of Judge Rothwax's
"Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice"
GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JusTIcE. By Judge Harold J. Rothwax. € New
York: Random House, 1996. Pp. xiv, 238. $23.00.
Reviewed by Paul L. Seave*
The role of "truth' 1 in the American criminal justice system has become
controversial. Until recently, the received wisdom in the legal profession was that
truth somehow emerged from the battle "zealously"2 pursued by adversarial counsel.
Moreover, the profession generally accepted the limitations on truth-seeking imposed
in the name of constitutionally-based values.
In the past several years, however, practitioners, academics, and judges have
begun to question the efficacy of an adversary system that they now view as
distorting the truth.3 Nonlawyers have begun to view the system as needlessly and
offensively driven by lawyers' fealty to client and self rather than to truth.4
Judge Harold J. Rothwax, a trial judge on the New York Supreme Court for
twenty-five years, and a former criminal defense lawyer, has joined this debate. In
Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice,5 Rothwax gives forth his decidedly
conservative views of the criminal justice system.6 As heavy-handed with the reader
as he proudly claims to be with criminal defendants,7 the judge has written a polemic
proclaiming the very collapse of the criminal justice system. Alongside this high
decibel message is his brief, though more interesting consideration of this country's
t Judge, New York State Supreme Court.
* United States Attorney (Interim), Eastern District of California, and Adjunct Professor of Law,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. The views expressed in the Book Review are not necessarily
those of the United States Department of Justice.
I. The debate whether the adversarial system is sufficiently concerned with determining whether a crime
was committed--that is, what are the actual historical facts-uses the term "truth" (with a small "t) to refer to those
facts. This Article uses "truth" in the same pragmatic fashion.
2. See MODELCODEOFPRFESSiONALRESPONSIBiLrrY Canon 7 (1981) ("[A] Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSImLy DR 7-102
(1981) (setting forth the same language); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Preamble (1996) ("As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system").
3. See infra note 34.
4. Id.
5. JuDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1996).
6. ROTHWAX, supra note 5, at 13, 22.
7. Judge Rothwax states in the Prologue, "I know I have a reputation for being tough. Around Centre
Street, some lawyers even refer to me as 'the Prince of Darkness,' and it is well known that many defense attorneys
are loathe to appear before me." Id. at 12.
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approach to criminal justice and truth. This Review examines both the jeremiad and
the sotto voce discussion.
I. THE GUILTY GET-OFF!!!
The criminal justice system, Judge Rothwax explains, should reflect "equal
measures of truth and fairness." The problem, according to the judge is that "the
weight of other considerations"-principally the exclusionary rule applied in
furtherance of the Fourth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona 9 -"has actually made
truth subordinate and even irrelevant."' 0 "The bottom line," according to Rothwax,
is that "[c]riminals are going free." 11
The stories Rothwax uses to illustrate the bottom line, while always dramatic, are
not always accurate. Perhaps most striking is his discussion of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1971 decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.2 The police believed that
defendant Coolidge had slashed a fourteen-year-old girl's neck, shot her in the head,
and left her corpse in a snowdrift by the highway. After conducting a thorough and
fruitful investigation, the police searched Coolidge's car pursuant to a warrant issued
by the New Hampshire Attorney General in accordance with New Hampshire law.
The constitutional problem, of course, was that the Attorney General, who headed
the investigation, was hardly the "neutral and detached magistrate" called for by the
Fourth Amendment. 13 The Supreme Court so found, suppressed the fiber evidence
obtained from the car, and reversed the conviction. 4 Rothwax is outraged:
Although Coolidge's crime was a horrible one, and the conduct of the
police could not have been more restrained or professional, the criminal
went free because the constable blundered in the eyes of the U.S. Supreme
Court. There was a total lack of proportionality. Coolidge was the recipient
of a bonanza in our criminal justice sweepstakes. He won the lottery when
he persuaded the Court to overlook his horrible acts and focus on a minor
good-faith error by the police.
8. Id. at 22.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. ROTmVAX, supra note 5, at 23.
11. !d. at40.
12. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
13. Id. at 449-50 (quotation omitted).
14. Id. at 453-73.
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... This case happened more than twenty years ago, but it rattles me
every time I think about it. Did I become a judge for this? Is this the system
I am proud to be a part of? The Coolidge reversal makes me ashamed.5
Why does Coolidge prompt Rothwax to question the "system"? As he surely
knows but fails to mention, the criminal did not go free. Instead, defendant Coolidge
was retried and convicted, this time without use of the tainted evidence. 6
Rothwax likewise prefers drama over accuracy in his discussion of the Supreme
Court's 1977 decision in the "Christian burial speech" case, Brewer v. Williams.1
7
Defendant Williams, after being arrested and arraigned in Davenport, Iowa for
allegedly abducting and killing a ten-year-old girl, was to be transported 160 miles
to the Des Moines jail. The detectives who were to accompany Williams promised
his lawyer that they would not question Williams during the trip. That promise was
consistent with Massiah v. United States,'8 which thirteen years previously had held
that a formally-charged defendant could not be questioned without an attorney.' 9
During the trip to Des Moines, Detective Learning suggested to Williams that
they should stop and locate the girl's body because her parents were entitled to have
their daughter receive a Christian burial. The detective knew that Williams, a recent
escapee from a mental institution, was deeply religious. In response, the defendant
made several incriminating statements and led police to the body. The Supreme
Court suppressed that evidence under Massiah, and reversed the conviction. Again,
Judge Rothwax is outraged:
Although Williams'[s] case would be argued and reargued in the courts
for many years to come (including yet a second decision to overturn the
conviction), there was never any real doubt that he committed the crime.
There was no police abuse, coercion, or even questioning. He wasn't
threatened. [The detective] simply made an appeal to his conscience, to his
decency as a religious man. And Williams responded.
Sadly, this is where we've come: the point where a man who has com-
mitted a terrible wrong may not try to cleanse his conscience. There is no
respect for the truth. And I challenge you to find the justice.2 °
15. ROTHwAX, supra note 5, at 39 (emphasis added).
16. See Sol Wachtler, Crime and Punishment, NEw YORKER, May 1996, at 72,76.
17. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
18. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
19. Id. at 206-07.
20. ROTHWAx, supra note 5, at 18.
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Why is Judge Rothwax so troubled by Brewer? His reasons are for the most part
contradicted by the facts. First, and most important: contrary to Rothwax's
suggestion that Williams went unpunished, he was retried and convicted, and that
conviction was sustained-not overturned-by the Supreme Court.2' Second, there
appears to have been police abuse: after the detective promised defense counsel that
he would not question the defendant, he questioned him.
Third, Rothwax's view that there was no police questioning is flat-out incorrect.
The so-called Christian burial speech, set forth in the note below,22 patently reflects
the detective's intention to elicit incriminating information from the defendant. The
detective admitted this at trial. 3 The Iowa state courts assumed that the speech was
"tantamount to interrogation."24 Counsel for the prosecution acknowledged during
argument before the Supreme Court that the speech constituted interrogation.' And
the Supreme Court so found:
There can be no serious doubt.., that Detective Learning deliberately
and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely
as-and perhaps more effectively than-if he had formally interrogated him.
... [H]e purposely sought during Williams' [s] isolation from his lawyers to
obtain as much incriminating information as possible. Indeed, Detective
Leaming conceded as much when he testified at Williams' [s] trial.
26
21. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). in upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit's decision to overturn the conviction. See Nix v. Williams, 700 F.2d 1164 (1983), rev'd., 467 U.S.
431 (1984). It is hoped that Judge Rothwax's statement that there was "a second decision to overturn the
conviction" does not refer to the Eighth Circuit's rejected decision to reverse.
22. The Court's opinion states:
Addressing Williams as "Reverend," the detective said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road.... Number one, I
want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very
treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches
of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's
body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may
be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I felt
that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel
we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back
out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392-93.
23. Id. at 399.
24. Id. at 400 n.7.
25. Id. at 399 n.6.
26. Id. at 399.
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Finally, Rothwax's claim that the Court refused to allow a "fragile man of
conscience" to "cleanse his conscience" by identifying the body's location barely
passes the "smile" test. If defendant Williams's admissions were truly acts of
conscience, why did he challenge their admissibility? Then again, perhaps his
attorney coerced this "fragile man of conscience" to agree to such a challenge.
Rothwax simply fails to provide any support for his eye-catching contention that
"[w]henever [the exclusionary rule] is applied, a criminal goes free-no matter how
serious the crime or minor the police intrusion." Rothwax supplies no support for
his contention because the support does not exist.
The corrective measures that Rothwax urges-measures that are "so simple that
[they have].., escaped us for decades"---are themselves problematic. He could
have proposed modification of the exclusionary rule-the deterrent effect of that rule
has proven uncertain, 29 and the courts have shown their receptivity to "good faith
30
and other exceptions.3' It is the exclusion of evidence, after all, that is Rothwax's
major complaint. Instead, he goes much further and proposes the elimination of
current Fourth Amendment and Miranda jurisprudence.
As to the Fourth Amendment, Rothwax suggests the adoption of a case-by-case
"reasonableness" or "common sense" test:
This model uses reasonableness as a guide, and proposes that we not try to
set detailed guidelines for police behavior in every possible situation. In its
place the court will determine whether the search and seizure is reasonable
by considering all relevant factors on a case-by-case basis.
... [R]equiring police officers to use their common sense, and judging them
by that standard, seems more likely to produce sensible results than does a
set of unknowable rules and vague exceptions that neither the police nor the
courts can understand.
27. ROT-WAX, supra note 5, at 64.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Harry Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blaclanun's
Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom,
78 MARQ. L. REV. 45 (1994); Christine M. D'Elia, The Exclusionary Rule: Who Does It Punish?, 5 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 563 (1995); Heather Jackson. Arizona v. Evans: Expanding Exclusionary Rule Exceptions and
Contracting Fourth Amendment Protections, 86 J. CPIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1201 (1996).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
31. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (independent source and inevitable discovery);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (attenuation).
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And, oh, what a remarkable thing it would be if justice were applied
with such a simple eye to common sense!32
While it appears that the substance of Fourth Amendment law might change
under this approach, it seems likely that the new law would be no less complex or
tangled. In each case, an appellate court would have to determine whether the
particular factors supported the trial court's conclusion that the search and seizure
were or were not reasonable. Appellate courts would soon have to articulate Fourth
Amendment principles that would be as numerous and complex as the factual cir-
cumstances faced by the police, leaving the police no less confused than they are
now.
Rothwax's proposal to eliminate Miranda is based on his antipathy to the
exclusionary rule (i.e., defendants go free whenever evidence is suppressed), and
philosophical reasons, such as his contention that Miranda warnings somehow make
a suspect equal to the interrogating officers. Rothwax does not discuss, however,
whether Miranda has materially undermined law enforcement, and there is good
evidence to suggest that it has notO The burden is on Rothwax to consider this
question, or explain why it does not matter. He does neither.
II. Is THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ADEQUATELY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE TRUTH?
Even if Rothwax is wrong that the criminal justice system is in collapse-that
defendants are going free whenever the exclusionary rule is imposed-his predicate
assertion that the legal system has lost its concern for truth joins a national chorus
that something is wrong with the legal system. This chorus cannot be ignored. More
people than ever dislike lawyers. Lawyers themselves are increasingly disillusioned
with their profession, and numerous books and articles have been written attempting
to explain these phenomena.34
32. ROTHWAX, supra note 5, at 64-65.
33. Recent studies have found that in serious cases Miranda is responsible for the loss of a conviction in
few cases. Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 387
(1996) (3.8%), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits at Vanishingly Small
Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500,502 (1996) (near 1%).
34. See, e.g., WALT BACHMAN, LAW v. LIFE: WHAT LAWYERS ArE AFRAID TO SAY ABOUT THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1995); ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOSTLAWYERS: FAILING IDEALS OFTHE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993);
SOL M. LtNowrrz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE 20H CENTURY (1994); Sissela
Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1990); Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the
Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1148 (1990); Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1235
(1996); H. McNeil, The Good Life?, ARIZ. ATr'Y, Oct. 1994, at 16; Joel Reck, Achieving Greater Professional
Fulfillment, BOST. BJ., SeptJOL 1996, at 2; Randall Samborn, Anti-LawyerAttitude Up, NAT' LJ., Aug. 9,1993,
at 1.
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Has truth become a subordinate value in our judicial system? One way to
consider this issue is to ask the broad question whether the system yields "truthful"
results. Judge Rothwax attempted to answer that question by asserting, albeit without
any support (as discussed in Part I), that large numbers of defendants are going free
because reliable evidence of their guilt is being suppressed.
A second way to consider this issue is to ask the narrower question: even if the
system yields truthful results, are there particular rules of the system or particular
responsibilities of attorneys that are so at odds with "truth seeking" that they are
unacceptable? Judge Rothwax considered this question in his discussion of the
adversary system, the attorney-client privilege, and plea bargaining. Indeed, these
three topics are central to any analysis of truth in the criminal justice system. I now
turn to them.
A. Adversary System
As every law student knows, our litigative process is structured along adversarial
lines. Each lawyer puts forth to a passive, neutral decisionmaker a version of the
facts favorable to the client. The neutral decisionmaker-the judge and jury-is
supposed to resolve these conflicting versions in a manner that yields something akin
to the truth. Thus, at its most fundamental level, our system requires lawyers
primarily to advance their clients' interests with "zeal, 35 not to seek the truth. Not
surprisingly, attorneys reap rewards to the extent their clients win these battles.
Judge Rothwax is disgusted with the game-playing and distortions of truth that
occur in the course of zealous representation. He makes this abundantly clear in his
chapter titled "The Theater of the Absurd: Anything Goes in the Modern American
Courtroom":
The aspect of our criminal justice system that frustrates people the most
is that it seems so rife with game playing. Too often, attorneys appear to be
so involved with their own concerns that the issues of justice and fairness
become secondary. Such behavior only encourages cynicism on the part of
the public. And as an officer of the court, I have the unpleasant task of
making sure that the games stay out of my courtroom. It's not always in my
power to succeed ....36
35. See supra note 2.
36. ROTHWAX, supra note 5, at 121.
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At a trial, we have two gladiators in the ring-the defense and the
prosecution. The defense lawyer's only goal is to represent his client. His
only interest is his client-not society, not the victim.
In a court of law, only the prosecution is assigned the task of seeking the
truth. Since we know the truth is not the sole or even the primary objective,
we give the side that's not seeking the truth ample opportunity to suppress
the truth within the law."
Sadly, the culture that the defense lawyer inhabits today is one that says
it's okay to push the envelope, to brush against the ethical barrier and
occasionally slip over. The temptation to be overzealous can be very great.
... [Defense lawyers are] constantly representing guilty people. That's how
the envelope gets pushed. That's where the line gets crossed between pure
zeal and the excessive zeal that is designed to confuse, cloud, or hide the
truth.3 9
[O]ur adversarial system in its attention to fairness has spawned
excesses-most notably, an excessive tolerance of efforts by the contestants
to distort the truth.
In 1980, Marvin Frankel, then a federal district judge, wrote in a short
book, Partisan Justice, that the "search for truth" in the courtroom "fails too
much of the time." Frankel maintained that "our adversary system rates truth
too low among the values that institutions of justice are meant to serve."4
The way our adversarial system presently works not only diminishes the
possibility of truth, it encourages and fosters excess on the part of the
lawyers vying for the upper hand. The goal has become victory, not truth.
Our courtrooms have become casinos, with a professional culture of
misconduct so pervasive and so profound that it is often unrecognizable as
justice. Because we have ceased to see it clearly, we have also ceased to
question it honestly and rigorously.!'
37. Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 129-30.
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id. at 132.
41. Id. at 133.
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Despite Rothwax's extreme unhappiness with the extent to which game-playing
exceeds truth-seeking, he makes no suggestions for change, except to note that it will
have to be structural in nature.42 His silence is surprising, because there has been so
much thought dedicated to this issue, particularly since the O.J. Simpson criminal
trial.43 The types of changes under discussion range from the incremental to the
drastic. Commentators have suggested the following incremental changes: (1)
Having judges ask more questions of witnesses, (2) allowing jurors to ask questions
in writing, (3) allowing only the judge to engage in voir dire of prospective jurors,
(4) abolishing or drastically limiting peremptory challenges, and (5) allowing
nonunanimous verdicts. 44 Those advocating more extreme change have encouraged
the adoption of the nonadversarial criminal justice systems used in most western
European countries. The trials in those systems are dominated by the judges, not the
attorneys:
The Continental court usually consists of a single professional judge in
minor cases and a mixed bench, usually one professional and two lay judges
or, in more serious cases, three professional and two to nine lay judges. The
court, comprised of the professional judges and lay assessors, decides
questions of guilt and punishment in one proceeding. The dossier [i.e., a
comprehensive case file, which includes witness interviews, analyses of
physical evidence, etc., compiled by a prosecutor or magistrate] resides with
the presiding judge during the trial. The prosecutor and the defense attorney
will have reviewed the dossier, but it will not be available to the lay judges.
[T]he presiding judge calls witnesses and questions them.... Each
witness presents a narrative account and then responds to questions asked by
the presiding judge and by counsel. Questioning is informal, with few, if
any, objections by counsel and with the opportunity for lengthy explanations
and narrative responses.45
42. The closest Rothwax comes to suggesting a change is to ask wistfully: "[Clan we conceive-and should
we conceive-of a system in which defense attorneys would be more willing to view themselves as part of a system
of law, and less willing to see themselves as the alter ego of their client?" Id. at 139-40.
43. See, e.g., Philip Carrizosa, State Debates New Rules for Jury Verdicts, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 6. 1996, at
I (part 3 of On Trial: Reforming the Criminal Process); Philip Hager, Criminal Trial System Is Seen as Losing Its
Bearings, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 4, 1996. at 1 (part I of On Trial: Reforming the Criminal Process); Mike Lewis,
Outlookfor Reform Uncertain as Legislators Weigh Options, LA. DAILYJ., Mar. 7, 1996, at I (part 4 of On Trial:
Reforming the Criminal Process); Laura Mansnerus, Truth in the Simpson Trials: The Devil Is in the Details, N.Y.
TiNEs, Jan. 12, 1997, at 4-1; Charley Roberts, In Wake of Simpson, Some Experts Call for Bigger Role by Judges
in the Proceedings, L.A. DALY J., Mar. 5, 1996, at I (part 2 of On Trial: Reforming the Criminal Process).
44. Hager, supra note 43, at 9.
45. Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403,
422-24 (1992) (citations omitted).
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Since the court has independent responsibility for the accuracy and
justness of its decision, the court, rather than the parties, determines the
sequence of proof and may call witnesses on its own. However, the court
must examine all witnesses nominated by the parties unless their testimony
would be inadmissible in evidence."
In sum, there is an active and complex debate among those in the legal
profession about the numerous potential changes to our adversarial system. Judge
Rothwax's silence in this debate is surprising. Nevertheless, his complaints about
attorneys' distortions of the truth ring true, and will give further momentum to those
working to inject more truth-seeking into the adversarial process.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
Any discussion of truth and the criminal justice system leads to the attorney-
client privilege. Yet Rothwax pays it little attention.
The privilege, it appears, creates an intractable dilemma: once defense counsel
has learned the client's view of the truth through privileged discussions, can counsel
properly put on a defense that he knows to be inconsistent with his client's view
(e.g., by impeaching adverse witnesses who have testified truthfully, and eliciting
testimony inconsistent with the truth)?
At first blush, it seems obvious that defense counsel should not knowingly
present an untruthful defense. The attorney-client privilege, however, seeks to
encourage a client's full and candid disclosure to counsel by prohibiting counsel
from revealing that disclosure (voluntarily or under compulsion). Shouldn't the
privilege therefore, consistent with its goal of full disclosure and its promise of con-
fidentiality, prevent the client from being prejudiced by his disclosure? At minimum,
doesn't the privilege promise that the client will not be harmed by his full disclosure
to counsel? And if that is the case, must not counsel put on the best defense
regardless of its conflict with the client's disclosure?
The answers to these questions are best derived from a client's perspective. An
attorney who asks the client for full disclosure should advise that anything the client
says will not be disclosed. If the attorney adds that he will not advance any defense
inconsistent with the client's view of the truth, regardless of how much the client will
benefit from that untruthful defense, the client will be much less likely to make full
and honest disclosure, or any disclosure at all. Such a result, however, would under-
mine the rationale for the privilege.
46. Id. at 423 n.78 (citations omitted).
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Rothwax acknowledges these conclusions. He initially observes that in 1966
Professor Monroe Freedman concluded in his The Three Hardest Questions47 (of a
criminal defense lawyer) that a defense attorney can properly disregard his know-
ledge of the truth and impeach an honest witness, elicit false testimony, and give
legal advice that will tempt a client to commit perjury. 8 The judge ruefully notes that
the answers advanced by Professor Freedman "are, unfortunately, everyday practices
of the criminal defense lawyer."49 Rothwax concludes by noting that "because [these
practices] grow out of the confidentiality of the attorney-client privilege, they never
reach visibility within the system." 50
While Judge Rothwax is surely correct that this lack of truth-seeking is cloaked
by the attorney-client privilege, it does not arise from the privilege. Eliminating the
attorney-client privilege would not end the presentation of false defenses; instead, it
would reduce both the number of clients who make full and candid disclosures and
the number of attorneys who asked for such disclosures. Abrogating the privilege
would thus increase the number of attorneys who deliberately fail to learn their
clients' full and candid views of the truth. These attorneys would ignorantly, rather
than knowingly, present false defenses. Under either regime, the adversary system
would be no better off.
This brings us back to the adversary system. The problem of truth cannot be
addressed by modifying privileges and ethical rules. The problem, and the solution,
are to be found in the operation of the adversary system.5'
C. Plea-Bargaining
For all Rothwax's discussion about the distortions in adversarial proceedings, it
is plea-bargaining that dominates the criminal justice system. The vast majority of
all criminal cases are resolved through the plea-bargain process.5 That process has
been the subject of much criticism,53 the major concern being whether a plea to avoid
47. Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
48. ROTHWAX, supra note 5, at 140.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
52. In 1995, 92% of all convicted federal defendants pleaded guilty, and 78% of all charged federal
defendants pleaded guilty. KATHLEEN MAGUIRE & ANN L. PASTORE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINALJUSTICESTATISTICS-1995, 476 tbl.5.27 (1996). In 1992, 92% of all state defendants who were convicted
for committing the most serious offenses pleaded guilty. Id. at 498 tbl.5.47.
53. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LI. 1909, 1968
n.4 (1992).
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a harsh prison term is a coerced plea.' Rothwax's summary response-that (1) plea-
bargaining is a necessary evil in view of the complexity and volume of criminal
cases, and (2) defendants plea-bargain not as a result of coercion, but to obtain the
benefit of a better sentence'-is not very satisfactory. What is significant is that
Rothwax never evaluates plea-bargaining from a truth-seeking perspective-his
book's raison d'etre.
One standard by which to determine whether plea-bargains reflect the truth is to
compare the plea-bargaining process to our constitutionally-enshrined trial pro-
cedures: Do plea-bargains approximate the truth to the same extent as trials?56 At
trial, proof of guilt is provided by the prosecution's evidence, tested by cross-
examination, and assessed by a jury under a reasonable doubt standard. The trial,
moreover, is open to public scrutiny (with the exception of jury deliberations), which
helps maintain conformity to procedure.
The plea-bargaining process is very different. In a typical plea-bargain, a defen-
dant pleads guilty in exchange for a sentence that is lower than the sentence that
would be imposed if the defendant went to trial and were convicted. The offer and
acceptance process, moreover, are conducted in secrecy. The primary basis of truth-
determination in this process is the defendant's admission of guilt when entering the
guilty plea in court. It is assumed that a defendant would rarely admit guilt, with all
that is entailed-restriction of freedom, a criminal record-unless he committed the
crime. Indeed, many federal judges require defendants to state that they are pleading
guilty because they are guilty.
As the Supreme Court has recognized,57 however, defendants sometimes accept
a plea bargain, despite their assertions of innocence, because they believe that the risk
of conviction is unacceptably high. The defendant's evaluation of the inducement to
plead guilty is therefore critical to understanding a defendant's admission of guilt.
The evaluation begins with defense counsel, who determines both the probability
of conviction if the defendant goes to trial and the sentence that will likely follow if
there is a conviction. Then the defendant weighs the bargain-the certainty of a
reduced sentence-against the risk of conviction by trial and the greater sentence.
54. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LU. 1979. 1981 (1992).
55. ROTHWAx, supra note 5, at 144, 150, 157-58, 166.
56. Most plea-bargaining studies focus in part on whether innocent defendants are pleading guilty. While
that question reflects the ultimate concern with plea-bargaining, those studies ultimately fail because there is no data
on who is really guilty or really innocent. The approach used below above avoids this pitfall to some degree.
57. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,31-32 (1970)) (holding that a defendant can plead guilty even
if he maintains his innocence, so long as the plea is the product of an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right
to ajury trial).
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If defense counsel correctly concludes that there is a substantial likelihood of
trial conviction, then a resulting guilty plea would approximate the truth to the same
extent as a conviction by trial. A defendant could decide to plead guilty, however, on
counsel's erroneous recommendation that a trial conviction was very likely. In that
case, the guilty plea would not approach the truth as determined by trial standards,
for the trial would likely end in acquittal. A defendant could also decide to plead
guilty, despite counsel's correct assessment that trial conviction would be unlikely,
because of extreme risk averseness; again, such a plea would not represent truth from
the perspective of trial procedures. It therefore appears that a defendant's guilty
plea-by itself-cannot assure us, to the same degree as a trial verdict, that the
defendant is guilty.
If the trial court could examine defense counsel's assessment of litigation risk,
the court could perhaps determine whether the guilty plea met the standards for truth
established by trial procedures. But such assessments are protected from judicial
scrutiny by the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, the court, given its passive role
in the adversarial system, would have little basis to evaluate counsel's risk assess-
ment. For example, the court could not competently determine if there are witnesses
who could establish an alibi defense.
What the court does is "mak[e] such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a
factual basis for the plea."58 In practice, this means that the prosecutor provides a
brief summary of the evidence that bears on the elements of the pertinent crimes.
Questions from the bench about the summary are necessarily a rarity given a court's
lack of independent knowledge and cross-examination by defense counsel is of
course virtually nonexistent since defense counsel wants the court to accept the plea
bargain.
There is another factor that possibly justifies the criminal justice system's
confidence in, and reliance on, plea bargains. There is a general belief among most
judges, many defense attorneys, and much of the public that a charged defendant is
a guilty defendant. This belief is not based on knowledge of prosecutors' particular
charging decisions: those decisions are rarely reviewable. 9 and the adequacy of
evidence presented to a federal grand jury is never reviewable.' ° Instead, this belief
is based on familiarity with this nation's prosecutors: they are highly profes-
58. FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(0.
59. Charging decisions are reviewable only when there are founded allegations of selective or vindictive
prosecution. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-
29 (1974).
60. See., e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,50-51 (1992).
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sionalized, governed by strict standards of conduct, and loathe to bring cases they
cannot win. It is this belief in the good faith, competence, and diligence of
prosecutors that provides the basis for believing that guilty pleas resulting from plea
bargains approximate the truth.
Another view of plea bargain is that urged by the leading academic critics of the
process. These iconoclasts call for the abolition of plea-bargains, arguing that the
additional resources needed to prosecute all defendants by trial would not be
exorbitant. Other academic critics contend pretrial and trial procedures are so
complex and time-consuming, that the prosecution and judiciary feel compelled to
press defendants for guilty pleas. Simplification of criminal procedure, they
hypothesize, will reduce the pressure for guilty pleas and result in more trials.62
Given Judge Rothwax's willingness to cast aside existing Fourth Amendment
and Miranda jurisprudence, it is surprising that he accepts the short-term necessity
of plea-bargaining as a bar to discussion of its truth value.
III. CONCLUSION
Judge Rothwax's fundamental criticism of the criminal justice system-that it
unduly disregards the truth-reflects the general dissatisfaction with our criminal jus-
tice system, legal system, and public institutions. That dissatisfaction has occurred,
I would suggest, because television and the print medium have brought these once-
distant institutions into microscopic public view. The personal lives of our public
figures are now fair game for national viewing, and the media offers up endless
chatter about them.
If the public believes that its institutions are run by egoistic, self-interested
individuals, it will be hard-pressed to believe that those institutions, by their design,
can and do govern on the basis of truth and wisdom. To the extent that cynicism is
a deep feature of our national landscape, public institutions may need some
modification to give more emphasis to their truth-seeking capabilities. Our adversary
system is particularly subject to this problem because truth is sought indirectly
through the clash of self-interested claimants.
Judge Rothwax's book has captured the public's imagination by providing a
superficial thesis to rationalize the public's dissatisfaction with the criminal justice
system. It is a shame that Judge Rothwax fails to exploit his opportunity to educate
the public more fundamentally about the adversary system's role in the truth-
determination process.
61. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to
the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 931, 969-72 (1983).
62. See, e.g., id. at 931; John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHL L. R-v. 3. 14-19
(1978); Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 2004-05 (describing that less than 20% increase in total judicial resources
would be needed).
